In โThe Sound of Music,โ the nuns who are exasperated by the hard-to-manage Maria sing, โHow do you solve a problem like Maria?โ
For Virginia Republicans, this weekโs referendum results present the same old song and dance, except it goes like this: How do you solve a problem like Northern Virginia?
On Tuesday night, as the returns came in from the special election, the โnoโ side led most of the evening, but there was one big locality still outstanding: Fairfax County, Virginiaโs most populous locality and a community that casts more votes than any other. Those votes were predominantly โyes,โ so as the Fairfax votes came in, โyesโ edged ahead for a narrow win.
The real problem for the โnoโ side, though, was not the number of votes from Fairfax County but the margin of the โyesโ victory there. When political pros look at an election map, they donโt look at the number of votes โ thatโs important, but not the most important thing. The most important thing is the margin that a locality can deliver. Fairfax County isnโt just big, itโs also lopsided politically, and thatโs what drives Virginia politics โ including now, on the adoption of a new congressional map. If Republicans were more competitive in Fairfax County, as they once were, things might have been different.
Letโs show off our promised map and walk through why itโs different from most other election maps youโll see.
Most election maps color-code places red and blue, the color scheme Americans have adopted for our political parties. (If you go to other Western countries, the colors are reversed โ red for the left, blue for the right โ but Americans are different.)
Some election maps may shade those places in by the percentage of the vote each party gets โ so bright red for a strongly Republican community, a nice pink for a narrow Republican win.
Each of those maps serves its purpose, but that is not our purpose today. What this map shows, in a shaded, color-coded fashion, is the size of the margin for each side. (My software, oddly enough, doesnโt have a red/blue option, so here the green will be โyesโ and the red will be โno.โ)
Hereโs how to read this, and then weโll get into the significance. Letโs start with Virginia Beach. Itโs the third-largest locality in Virginia, behind Fairfax County and Prince William County. Itโs also a classic swing locality that is always fought over in each election. This week, Virginia Beach went โnoโ by a small margin โ 50.57% for โno,โ 49.43% for โyes.โ That was certainly an accomplishment for the โnoโ side โ last fall, Virginia Beach voted Democratic in the governorโs race โ but it didnโt provide much of a margin. Lots of votes for both sides, but โnoโ came out of Virginia Beach with only a 1,692-vote advantage.
By contrast, when Fairfax County finally reported, it came in at 69.51% โyesโ โ and, in a community that large, that vote share translated into a margin of 147,521 votes on the โyesโ side.
Statewide, โyesโ won by 88,916 votes. Mathematically, that margin out of Fairfax County is what made the difference. Itโs difficult to overstate the political magnitude of those Fairfax margins. The locality with the biggest margin for the โnoโ side was Bedford County, which delivered a 22,228-vote margin on behalf of โno.โ If you add the five localities with the biggest โnoโ margins together โ Augusta County, Bedford County, Campbell County Hanover County, Rockingham County, an all-star cast of Republican counties โ you still only get a โnoโ margin of 95,427. This is the structural disadvantage that Republicans have in statewide elections in Virginia.
There are several points to be made here.
Republicans used to be competitive in Northern Virginia, then it realigned
Through the 2000 presidential election, Fairfax County was a reliably Republican county. The big political earthquake in Virginia was a realignment in the early part of the century, when first Fairfax County, and then Loudoun County and Prince William County, switched from red to blue. Even as late as 2009, though, Fairfax County could still be persuaded to go Republican in the governorโs race. Isaac Newton found that for every action there is an equal but opposite reaction. The reaction in Virginia was rural areas, especially Southwest Virginia, switching from blue to red โ except that wasnโt an even trade in terms of votes or margins. This realignment predated Donald Trump, although his emergence as a political force has accelerated all these trends, making suburbs more Democratic and rural areas more Republican. In Virginia, the political effect has been to make Republicans less competitive.
This isnโt purely a Northern Virginia phenomenon; we just focus there because itโs so big. Other suburban localities have realigned, too โ notably Henrico and Chesterfield counties around Richmond. Virginia Republicans, who once relied on those suburban votes, have yet to figure out how to win elections in this new political configuration except under occasional circumstances. Glenn Youngkin in 2021 was one of those. He mobilized rural voters in record fashion, but also cut into Democratic margins in Fairfax County. He needed both of those to eke out a win.
For comparison purposes, the Democratic margin out of Fairfax County in 2021 was 134,206; last fall it ballooned to 213,924. The โnoโ side this week cut it to 147,521, but that still wasnโt good enough.
This wasnโt necessarily a case of Republicans performing better in Fairfax, either. It was really a case of Democrats underperforming. Statewide, the โnoโ side drew more votes than the Republican candidate for governor did last fall. One notable exception was in Fairfax County, where the โnoโ side ran 773 votes below Winsome Earle-Searsโ tally โ and she was the weakest Republican candidate for governor in 60 years. Those โmissingโ 773 votes hardly mattered statewide, but they do speak to a problem Republicans have. Republicans simply need to figure out how to run better in suburban localities, especially Northern Virginia. Republicans downstate can complain about being โFairfaxed,โ or they can work on improving their numbers there. Thatโs not politics, thatโs just math.
Rural localities have an outsized impact because of their lopsided margins
This will seem contradictory in the same way that Schrodingerโs cat is both dead and alive at the same time. While rural localities have seen their influence overall decline, they have seen their importance to Republicans increase.
Hereโs how margins work: Chesapeake is a key locality because itโs populous and, in political terms, โswingy.โ However, because itโs โswingy,โ it often doesnโt produce large margins for either side. This week, Chesapeake voted โyes,โ with a margin of 1,199 votes. Tiny Craig County, though, produced a โnoโ margin of 1,553 votes โ so Craig County essentially erased Chesapeake.
The โyesโ side came out of Chesterfield County with a margin of 9,781 votes. Franklin County, Pittsylvania County and Washington County each had a bigger margin on the โnoโ side โ a 12,000-plus edge for โnoโ in each locality, so take your pick as to which one canceled out Chesterfield.
The problem for Republicans is that they eventually run out of these rural counties with big margins and donโt have anything to counter those big margins out of Northern Virginia โ especially Fairfax County โ with.
This map also shows why Democratic candidates donโt visit Roanoke much
Roanoke is the biggest blue island west of Charlottesville/Albemarle County, but itโs surrounded by a vast red sea. Remember what I said about Newtonโs Third Law of Motion about action and reaction? Politicians have to be careful about triggering unintended reactions. Yes, Roanoke delivered a 6,305-vote margin for the โyesโ side, but Roanoke County wiped that away with an 11,273-vote margin on the โnoโ side of the ledger. A campaign has to worry that, yes, we can send our candidate to Roanoke to squeeze more votes out of the city, but the risk is that it simply provokes more people in Roanoke County (and Salem and Botetourt County and โฆ) to vote the other way.
Democrats are unlikely to show up west of the Blue Ridge for the same reason that Vice President JD Vance probably didnโt campaign in Virginia on behalf of the โnoโ side โ fear of helping the other side more than you do your own. Instead, he went to Hungary to campaign for Viktor Orban โ and lost there, as well. A Vance appearance might have ramped up Republican turnout in Virginia, but likely would have dialed up Democratic turnout more.
In the end, all the math I run comes back the same: Since Republicans donโt have any counties where they can produce a 147,521-vote margin out of Fairfax County, they only have two choices. One is to increase turnout in the low-turnout parts of rural Virginia, which probably wonโt give them 147,521 votes but would get them closer. The other is to do better in Fairfax County. Can they?
Iโll have lots more to say about the referendum results in todayโs edition of West of the Capital, our weekly political newsletter that goes out Friday afternoons. If youโre not on the list, we can fix that right now:

